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THE THREAT TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE BY
CRITICISM OF JUDGES-A PROPOSED
SOLUTION TO THE REAL PROBLEM
Monroe H. Freedman*
This Article is in two parts. The first argues that criticism of judges
by lawyers is both constitutionally protected and desirable in a democratic society. The second part suggests an appropriate judicial response in
the rare case where judicial independence is truly threatened by criticism
of a judge.
I.

LAWYERS' CRITICISM OF JUDGES Is DESIRABLE AND
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED

The problem is not that too many lawyers are publicly criticizing
judges. Unfortunately, too few lawyers are willing to do so, even when
a judge has committed serious ethical violations and should be held
accountable.1
For example, the New York State Bar Association recently debated
a proposal to amend the state's ethical rules to require lawyers to report
serious misconduct of judges.2 You might expect lawyers to welcome
such a rule. After all, lawyers have a "special responsibility for the
quality of justice." Also, establishing an ethical duty to report would
make it clear that a lawyer who reports judicial misconduct is not a
volunteer, but is acting, in part, because she would herself be violating
a disciplinary rule if she failed to complain. The proposed rule was voted
down, however, on the expressed concern that "a judge who knows that

* Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Law, Hofstra University.
1. I am not unconcerned about judicial independence. See my testimony before Congress,
opposing proposed legislation to discipline federal judges by means short of impeachment in
Removal and Disciplineof FederalJudges, 31 MERCER L. REv. 681 (1980). See also infra Part II.
2. See House Approves Proposed Amendments to Code, STATE B. NEWS (New York State
Bar Ass'n), July-Aug. 1996, at 1, 6.

3. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Preamble (1992).
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a lawyer has reported misconduct could hold it against the lawyer in
current or future cases." 4 In addition, some judges forget about the First
Amendment when free speech is directed at them and take disciplinary
action against the lawyer.'
Unlike New York, most jurisdictions have adopted Model Rule
8.3(b), which requires a lawyer to volunteer information about serious
violations of judicial ethics to the appropriate authority. With regard to
public criticism of judges, Model Rule 8.2(a) forbids a lawyer to make
a statement about a judge that the lawyer "knows to be false or with
reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity."7 That is, lawyers are
properly subject to a New York Times Co. v. Sullivan8 "actual malice"
standard9 in their public criticism of judges.
Lawyers, of course, are particularly knowledgeable about judges'
conduct, and are therefore in a position to inform the public about abuses
of judicial power. Moreover, judges are not "anointed priests" entitled to
special protection from the public clamor of democratic society' ° The
law gives judges and the institutional reputation of courts "no greater

4. House Approves ProposedAmendments to Code, supra note 2, at 6.
A rule requiring lawyers to report such conduct would make it clear that zealous
representation does not require tolerance ofjudges who commit serious violations ofjudicial ethics.
Note, however, that confidentiality would still override an obligation to report judicial misconduct.
As stated in Model Rule 8.3(c), reporting is forbidden if doing so would require the lawyer to reveal
client information protected by Model Rule 1.6. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 83(c).
5. See, e.g., In re Snyder, 734 F.2d 334, 337 & n.6 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 472 U.S. 634
(1985).
One exception is Minnesota Judge Jack Nordby. A decision Judge Nordby made to release
a defendant on bail
resulted in a number of vituperative calls and letters from citizens as well as a strident ... editorial, the gist of which was (to paraphrase politely) that [he] was a poor
judge and should not be re-elected, a goal several of them, usually anonymously, pledged
to pursue. All of this, of course, is entirelyproperand to be encouraged ....
Minnesota v. Andersen, 4th Judicial Dist., File #96 089254 (emphasis added) (on file with author).
Judge Nordby added that "petulant and anonymous resort to journalists, while unquestionably an
essentialandprotectedform ofexpression, andperhaps a desirablesupplement to good courtroom
advocacy, is a poor substitute for it." Id. (emphasis added).
6. See MODEL RULES OF PROFSSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(b). New York does require a
lawyer to reveal knowledge of judicial misconduct, but only "upon proper request of a tribunal or
other authority empowered to investigate or act upon the conduct of... judges." NEW YORK CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-103(B) (1995).
7. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.2(a).
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
9. See id. at 279-80.
10. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 292 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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immunity from criticism than other persons or institutions."" Those
First Amendment truths were reiterated by the Supreme Court in an
opinion by Chief Justice Warren Burger. 2 Judges, after all, are not
"flabby creatures." 13 Rather, they are expected to be "[people] of
fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate.', 14 Thus, we have a practice
"familiar in the long history of Anglo-American litigation, whereby
unsuccessful... lawyers give vent to their disappointment in tavern or
press.'

5

Consider, then, the following cases of judicial criticism:
Case 16
One: The judge's opinion is "irrational" and "cannot be taken
seriously.'
Case Two: "This judge sitting on the bench is a danger to the people
of this city."' 7

Case Three: "I have had more than enough of judicial opinions that
...falsify the facts of the cases that have been argued, ... that make
disingenuous use or omission of material authorities,... that cover up
these things .... 18
Case Four.The state's appellate judges are "whores who became
madams .... I would like to [be a judge] ....But the only way you can
get it is to be in politics or buy it-and I don't even know the going
19
price.'2
Case Five: The judge's decision is "overt racism," and the
defendants "have no more chance of having a fair hearing in front of [the
judge] than they would being judged by the Ku Klux Klan."2'
Case Six: The judge is "dishonest," "ignorant," a "buffoon," a
"bully," "drunk on the bench," and shows "evidence of anti-Semit' 21

ism.

Do any of these criticisms warrant professional discipline of the
lawyer?

11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 289.
See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838-39, 842 (1978).
United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941).
Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947).

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Morgan, 313 U.S. at 421.
See infra text accompanying
See infra text accompanying
See infra text accompanying
See infra text accompanying
See infira text accompanying
See infra text accompanying

notes 22-23.
notes 24-28.
note 29.
notes 30-34.
notes 35-36.
notes 37-63.
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The quotation in Case One will be familiar to most readers as what
passes for civil discourse among Supreme Court Justices. The particular
quotations ("irrational," "cannot be taken seriously") were directed
against Justice Sandra Day O'Connor by Justice Antonin Scalia.' No
professional disciplinary action has been reported against Justice Scalia,
or any other Justice, for these or other incivil remarks.23
The quotation in Case Two (the judge is a "danger to the people')
is a criticism of a New York City criminal court judge by Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani (a lawyer).24 It is similar to other remarks about the
judge by Governor George Pataki (also a lawyer).2" Similarly, New
York Criminal Court Judge Harold Rothwax boasts that he informs his
students at Columbia Law School, "The court of appeals is in session; we
are all in danger.' 26 Further ridiculing the administration of justice,
Rothwax has written that a jury trial is a "crapshoot" 2 7 and that New
York's highest court is a "lottery."' No professional disciplinary action
has been reported against Mayor Giuliani, Governor Pataki, or Judge
Rothwax for these public attacks on judges or for disparaging the judicial
system.
The intemperate and broad-scale attack on the integrity of judges in
Case Three (complaining that judges too often falsify facts and use
authorities dishonestly) is from a talk that I gave to the Judicial
Conference for the Federal Circuit.29 Fortunately, no disciplinary action
was taken on that occasion.
Case Four ("whores," "madams," and the "going price" for a
judgeship) is from a Life magazine article about a New York lawyer

22. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,532,536 n.* (1989) (concurring
opinion).
23. See Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., The Importance of Dissent and the Imperative of
Judicial Civility, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 583, 641-42 (1994); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a
Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1188-98 (1992).
24. See Mayor Presses Ouster ofAbuse Case Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1996, § 1, at 29.
25. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Judge Rebuked Afler a Woman Is Slain, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15,
1996, at B3.
26. HAROLD J. ROTIWAX, GULTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JusTicE 31 (1996). Not
everyone finds Judge Rothwax's commentaries to be either amusing or accurate. See, e.g., Steven
Duke, Crime andPunishment,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1996, § 7 (Book Review), at 8 (concluding that
Judge Rothwax's book is "deeply misleading about the system as a whole").
27. RoTivAX, supra note 26, at 162.
28. Id.at 31.
29. See The Seventh Annual JudicialConference ofthe United States Court ofAppealsfor the
FederalCircuit,128 F.R.D. 409,439 (1989); see also Monroe Freedman, When Judges Tamper with
the Evidence, LEGAL TIms, Nov. 19, 1990, at 22 (discussing the problem of dishonest judicial
opinions).
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named Martin Erdmann. ° Erdmann was subjected to disciplinary
proceedings and censured for his comments, but the discipline was
reversed by the New York Court of Appeals.3 Yet Erdmann's
comments had been published in a magazine with a circulation of several
million copies,32 and as pointed out by a dissenting judge, "[ilt is
difficult to read the article ... without coming to the conclusion that
neither the legal system nor the legal profession possesses integrity. 33
Nevertheless, New York's highest court held 5-2 that
isolated instances of disrespect for the law, Judges and courts expressed
by vulgar and insulting words or other incivility, ... or committed
outside the precincts of a court are not subject to professional
discipline. Nor is the matter substantially altered if there is hyperbole
expressed in the impoverished vocabulary of the street."
The quotation in Case Five (comparing the judge to the Ku Klux
Klan) was by Ronald L. Kuby. The disciplinary committee dismissed a
complaint against Kuby, and the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut affirmed. 35 The court said that Kuby's statement
"concerning a highly respected judge.., was, to be charitable, intemperate, incivil and immature. It was not, however, actionable under the
Disciplinary Rules... and First Amendment jurisprudence."3' 6
The charge in Case Six ("dishonest," "buffoon," "drunk," etc.)
resulted, initially, in suspension of a lawyer from practice before the
federal district court for two years. 7 The grounds were that the lawyer,
Stephen Yagman, had violated local rules forbidding a lawyer to engage
in conduct that 'degrades or impugns the integrity of the Court"' and
"'interferes with the administration of justice."' 38 But that disciplinary

30. See James Mills, I Have Nothing to Do with Justice, LiFE, Mar. 12, 1971, at 56, 66.
31. See Justices of the Appellate Div. v. Erdmann, 301 N.E.2d 426, 427 (N.Y. 1973) (per

curiam).
32. See id.
at 430 & n.1 (Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting).

33. Id. at 428 (Burke, J., dissenting).
34. L at 427 (citation omitted).
35. See In re Kuby, G.P.-86-10 (D. Conn. Aug. 18, 1993) (affir-ing motion to dismiss) (on
file with author).
36. Id.

37. See Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1434 & n.4, 1435 (9th Cir.
1995).
38. Id. at 1436 (quoting Local Rule 2.5.2 ofthe U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California).
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action was39 reversed by the Ninth Circuit in an opinion by Judge Alex
Kozinski.

Bound by prior authority in his circuit, Judge Kozinski was not able
to apply New York imes Co. v. Sullivan.4° The Sullivan "actual malice"
standard protects even false charges against a public official unless
made with knowledge of falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth. 1
As applied by the Ninth Circuit in disciplinary cases against lawyers,
however, recklessness is determined objectively, by reference to the kind
of investigation that would be made by "'the reasonable attorney,
considered in light of all his professional functions ... in the same or
similar circumstances.' 42 The court's "inquiry focuses on whether the

attorney had a reasonable factual basis for making the statements,43
considering their nature and the context in which they were made,"
and may include "whether the attorney pursued readily available avenues
of investigation." Truth is, of course, an absolute defense, and the
burden of proving falsity is on the disciplinary committee.45
As Judge Kozinski noted, this standard is consistent with cases like
In re Holtzman." There, Kings County District Attorney Elizabeth
Holtzman was reprimanded for issuing a press release that falsely
accused a judge of requiring the victim of a sexual assault to demonstrate
the position she had been in at the time of the assault.47 Before making
her charges public, Holtzman had not obtained the minutes of the
proceedings, had not made any effort to speak to court officers, the court
reporter, defense counsel, or any other person present during the alleged
misconduct, and had not even met with the trial assistant in her office
who had originally reported it.48 Thus, she had been reckless in not
"pursu[ing] readily available avenues of investigation4 9 before making
false charges against the judge.50

39. See id. at 1438-45.
40. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
41. See id. at 279-80.
42. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437 (quoting United States Dist. Court v. Sandlin, 12 F.3d 861, 867

(9th Cir. 1993)).
43. Id. (citing Sandlin, 12 F.3d at 867).

44. Id. at 1437 n.13.
45. See id. at 1438.
46. 577 N.E.2d 30 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam).
47. See i. at 31-32.
48. See i. at 32-33.
49. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1437 n.13.
50. Holtzman's lawyer, Norman Redlich, has noted, however, that she acted only after she had
a sworn statement from the prosecutor who had been present at the hearing. See Letter from Norman
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Unlike allegations of fact, opinions are not subject to proof or
disproof. This means, Judge Kozinski noted, that an expression of
opinion (like an allegation of intellectual dishonesty or being the worst
judge on the bench) cannot be punished unless it implies a false assertion
of fact. "'[I]f it is plain that the speaker is expressing a subjective view,
an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than claiming
to be in possession of objectively verifiable facts, the statement is not
actionable."''
With regard to the allegation of anti-Semitism, Yagman said that the
judge "'has a penchant for sanctioning Jewish lawyers: me, David
Kenner and Hugh Manes. I find this to be evidence of anti-semitism." 2
In rejecting the charge against Yagman on this count, Judge Kozinski
relied, in part, on the Restatement (Second) of Torts which states that a
"simple expression of opinion based on disclosed ... nondefamatory
facts is not itself sufficient for an action of defamation, no matter how
unjustified and unreasonable the opinion may be or how derogatory it
is."5

Yagman's statement that the judge had been "'drunk on the bench,"'
however, "could reasonably be interpreted as suggesting that [the judge]

had actually, on at least one occasion, taken the bench while intoxicated." -' It therefore "implies ... facts that are capable of objective
verification."5 However, the committee presenting disciplinary charges
against Yagman had the burden to prove the falsity of Yagman's
statement about the judge's drunkenness, and it failed to present any
evidence at all on that issue. 6 Accordingly, Yagman could not be
disciplined for that statement either.5
Those who argue that lawyers are entitled to less freedom of speech
than other citizens in criticizing judges rely principally on two Supreme
Court decisions, neither of which are on point. One case is FloridaBar

Redlich to Monroe H. Freedman (Apr. 19, 1996) (on file with author). This fact does not appear in
the court's opinion.
51. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1441 (quoting Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1227
(7th Cir. 1993)).
52. Id. at 1438. The court was quoting statements that Yagman made to a newspaper reporter.
See Susan Seager, JudgeSanctions Yagman, Refers Case to State Bar,L.A. DAILY J., June 6, 1991,
at 1.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. c (1977); see also Yagman, 55 F.3d at
1439.
54. Yagman, 55 F.3d at 1441 (quoting Seager, supra note 52, at 1).
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
at 1441-42.
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v. Went For It, Inc.58 Went ForIt, Inc. involved solicitation of clients,
which is commercial speech and therefore receives only "a limited
measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the
scale of First Amendment values. 5 9 By contrast, criticism of a public
official is core First Amendment speech.60 Thus, Went For It, Inc., a
commercial speech case, cannot justify restrictions on criticism of the
official conduct of judges.
The other Supreme Court case limiting lawyers' speech is Gentile
v. State Bar of Nevada.6 ' However, the five-member majority in Gentile
emphasized that the case did not involve speech alone, but also involved
the conflicting right to a fair trial. The majority held that "[t]he
regulation of attorneys' speech [adopted in Gentile] is limited-it applies
only to speech that is substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial
effect [on a fair trial]."'62 Thus, Gentile is inapplicable to criticism of a
judge that does not relate to a pending or impending trial.
Judge Kozinski concluded his opinion in Yagman with a quotation
from Justice Hugo Black:
" he assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding
judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of
American public opinion. For it is a prized American privilege to speak
one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public
institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the
name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender
resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance
respect" 63
Therefore, like Justice Scalia, Judge Rothwax, Governor Pataki, and
Mayor Giuliani, lawyers in general do not forfeit their First Amendment
rights to criticize public officials when they become members of the bar.
II. THE REAL PROBLEM AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION
We are told, however, that judicial independence is a "'crown
jewel' in our system of government, a jewel that will be shaken from

58. 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995).
59. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
60. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272-73, 279-83 (1964).

61. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
62. Id. at 1076.
63. 55 F.3d at 1445 (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941)).
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the crown if judges are subjected to criticism. 6 Is that true? If so, to
what extent? And, where judicial independence is threatened, what is the
appropriate judicial response?
One thing is plain. Much of the judicial hand-wringing about
criticism of judges has more to do with judicial vanity than with judicial
independence. Take, for example, the most extreme of the illustrations
discussed above. Surely, Erdmann's widely publicized references to
whores, madams, and corruption in the selection of judges65 is an
assault on the amourpropre of judges. It is even possible that Erdmann
would cause some members of the public to become concerned about
selecting judges by what the New York Times recently called a "clubhouse-dominated election system."'66 But how was judicial independence
threatened by Erdmann's remarks?
Or consider the Holtzman case, where the lawyer was sanctioned for
erroneously accusing the judge of having demeaned the victim in a rape
case.67 Understandably, the judge felt a sense of grievance over the
accusation. Nevertheless, Holtzman's criticism was unlikely to affect the
judge's independence on the bench.
There are some criticisms that do indeed threaten the independence
of the judiciary, but these are not the criticisms of practicing lawyers like
Erdmann, Holtzman, Yagman, and Kuby. Rather, the real threat to
judicial independence comes from public officials, from lawyers like
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, Governor George Pataki, and President Bill
Clinton--that is to say, from people who have the power to affect a
judge's career on the bench. And, ironically, when those officials criticize
judges and expressly threaten them with removal from office because of
particular decisions, no disciplinary action is ever taken.
An instance in which a judge's independence was, in fact, compromised is the recent case involving Judge Harold Baer. In a drug case,
Judge Baer suppressed a large quantity of cocaine that had been seized
from the trunk of the defendant's car.68 Relying in part on material
discrepancies between an officer's testimony and his written report, Judge
Baer found the accused more credible than the officers regarding the

64. Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Joins Fray on Rulings, Defending JudicialIndependenCe,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at Al (quoting U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice William Rehnquist,

who stated that judicial independence is "'one of the crown jewels of our system of government").
65. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34.
66. No Way to ChooseJudges, N.Y. TAIES, Nov. 11, 1996, at A14.
67. See In re Holtzman, 577 N.E.2d 30, 32 (N.Y. 1991) (per curiam).
68. See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated, 921 F. Supp. 211
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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events surrounding the seizure of the evidence.69 As a result of that
decision, President Bill Clinton threatened to ask for the judge's
resignation if he did not reverse himself.7 ° Then Senate Majority Leader
Robert Dole added that if the judge did not resign, "'he ought to be
impeached,"'' and 140 members of Congress agreed. 72
In response, Chief Judge Jon 0. Newman and three senior judges of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denounced the
threats against Judge Baer as "'an extraordinary intimidation' of a judge
in a pending case.73 Indeed, a substantial number of prominent lawyers

69. See id. at 242. Contrary to police testimony, the judge found that four young men had not
run away from the defendant's car when they saw the police. See id at 241-42. The judge added that
even if the men had run when the police began to stare at them, it would not have been grounds for
searching the car. See id. at 242. In support of that conclusion, he cited documented findings of
serious police corruption and abuse in that precinct. See id. at 242 & n.1 8. Professor Chester Mirsky
of New York University Law School and Professor Paul Rothstein of Georgetown Law Center have
endorsed the judge's reasoning on this point. See Henry J. Reske, A Duffel Bag of Controversyfor
Judge, A.B.A. J., May 1996, at 32; see also Michael E. Tigar, FlightIsn'tAbout Guilt, NAT'L L.J,
Apr. 15, 1996, at A23 (discussing the issue of flight as not always "betoken of a guilty mind").
70. See Alison Mitchell, Clinton PressingJudgeto Relent, N.Y. TIMS, Mar. 22, 1996, at Al.
71. Katharine Q. Seelye, A Get-Tough Message at California'sDeath Row, N.Y. TIES, Mar.
24, 1996, § 1, at 29.
72. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Dismissing Defense Effor Judge Stays on Drug Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 1996, § 1, at 25 [hereinafter Van Natta, DismissingDefense Effort].
Defense counsel alleged in court papers that Judge Baer had sent his clerk to the press room
at the federal district courthouse to get a transcript of White House remarks about asking for his
resignation. Judge Baer did not deny the allegation. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Judge Baer Takes
Himself Off Drug Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1996, at BI [hereinafter Van Natta, Judge Takes
Himself Off Case].
73. Anthony Lewis, Where Would You Hide?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,1996, at A15; see also Don
Van Natta, Jr., Judges Defend a Colleaguefrom Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1996, at Bl.
The defense of Judge Baer by so many judges exposes the fallacy that judges are forbidden
to defend themselves against criticism. In fact, "[a] judge may speak, write, lecture, teach and
participate in other extra-judicial activities concerning the law, the legal system, [and] the
administration ofjustice." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4B (1990) (footnote omitted).
The pertinent limitation is that a judge may not make a public comment "while a proceeding is
pending or impending in any court," but even that limitation applies only if the comment "might
reasonably be expected to affect [the proceeding's] outcome or impair its fairness." Id. Canon 3B(9).
Indeed, the proceeding was still pending before Judge Baer when the four Second Circuit
judges published their comments. Acknowledging Canon 3B(9), the judges stated that "the Code also
places on judges an affirnative duty to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. In
this instance, we believe our duty under this latter provision overrides whatever indirect comment
on a pending case might be inferred from this statement (and we intend none)." Van Natta, supra,
at B1; see also An Alertfiom the ChiefJustice,N.Y. TIMms, Apr. 11, 1996, at A24 (discussing Chief
Justice William Rehnquist's defense ofjudicial independence against the threat of politicians "who
have taken to berating judges with whose decisions or philosophies they disagree'); James Dan,
Pataki, in High Court, Exchanges Barbs with Top Judge, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1996, at B3
(discussing "the rights and responsibilities of politicians in criticizing members of the judiciary);
Clyde Haberman, Under Fir Judge Decides to Fire Back, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1996, at BI
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and jurists spoke out on behalf of Judge Baer, expressing their deep
concern about the independence of the judiciary.7 4 In short, judicial
independence had many fervent and eloquent defenders.
But there is something missing in this picture. Despite all of the
rhetoric by Judge Baer's defenders about the independence of the
judiciary, there was no reference to Carol Bayless. Understandably, in
fact, many readers will wonder who Carol Bayless is and what she has
to do with judicial independence. The answer is that Ms. Bayless was the
defendant whose Fourth Amendment rights Judge Baer upheld (along
with the constitutional rights of all of us) at the first suppression hearing.' On the basis of that hearing, Judge Baer found that the police had
unlawfully seized evidence against Ms. Bayless and that they had
testified falsely to cover up their own wrongful conduct.76 Specifically,
he found that Ms. Bayless's testimony relating to the seizure of the
'
while the police testimony was
evidence had "great credibility,"77
'
"incredible." Accordingly, as required by Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Judge Baer suppressed the evidence against Ms. Bayless. It was
at that point that political pressure mounted against the judge-the
President demanding that he resign and Congress threatening impeachment-unless he reversed his decision suppressing the evidence against
Ms. Bayless.79
Judge Baer got the message. He conducted a rehearing and reversed
his decision.8" And no one was in doubt about what had happened. The
New York limes headlined its front-page report, UnderPressure,Federal

(discussing one judge's action in light of what has been characterized as "open season on judges").
In addition, speaking before a circuit conference, Second Circuit Judge (and former Yale

Law School Dean) Guido Calabresi stated that it is "perfectly appropriate" for a judge to make a
statement in response to suggestions that he or she should resign or be impeached because of an

unpopular ruling. Henry J. Reske, Questions of Independence, A.B.A. J., June 1996, at 110, 112.
74. "Some 27 bar associations and the deans of seven law schools ...

condemn[ed] [the]

'intemperate and personal' attacks that 'diminish the independence of the judiciary.' Many federal
judges also defended Baer." Reske, supra note 69, at 32.
75. See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated, 921 F. Supp. 211

(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
76. See id. at 242-43.

77. Id. at 236.
78. Id. at 240, 242.

79. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
80. See United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211, 215-18 (S.D.N.Y.), vacating 913 F. Supp.

232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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Judge Reverses Decision in Drug Case." Similarly, the National Law
Journalheadline was, Under Fire,Judge Reverses Himself. 2
In an attempt to justify reversing himself, Judge Baer noted that the
prosecution, at the second hearing, had introduced the police officers'
report of the arrest and seizure, which they had filed shortly after the
arrest.83 Ironically, however, the police report appeared to impeach the
officers' credibility even more. In their testimony, the officers said that
a crucial fact justifying the stop was that the men who had put duffels4
bags into Ms. Bayless's car had run away when they saw the officers.
But the police report said nothing about the men fleeing. 5 Judge Baer
resolved this discrepancy in the prosecution's evidence by ignoring it. 6
Indeed, the New York limes article about the second hearing carried the
subheadline, Judge " New Ruling Puzzles Experts Who Say Evidence Did
Not Change.7 As the New York Times commented editorially, Judge
Baer's "impartiality has been hopelessly compromised."'8 8
What then should Judge Baer have done when faced with "extraordinary intimidation" by politicians who held the power to promote him
to higher office or to impeach him? What should any judge do whose
impartiality has been "hopelessly compromised"? The answer is clear.
Under federal law, Judge Baer should have disqualified himself from
the case prior to the rehearing on the suppression motion. 9 Before
amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 455 in 1974, there was understood to
be a judicial "duty to sit," and the standard for disqualification was
subjective.9" Now, however, the duty to sit has been reversed, and the
standard is objective. 91 Section 455(a) requires that the judge "shall"
disqualify himself whenever "his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned."'92 This statutory language requires the judge to avoid "the

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Don Van Natta, Jr., N.Y. TIMas, Apr. 2, 1996, at Al.
Deborah Pines, NAT'L W., Apr. 15, 1996, at A12.
See Bayless, 921 F. Supp. at 215.
See id.at216.
See Don Van Natta, Jr., Drug Case Reversal,N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 3, 1996, at B3.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id.
See id.
JudgeBaer's Ext, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1996, at A18.
See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994).
See H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355.
See 28 U.S.C. § 455; Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994).

92. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The identical rule is applicable to state judges. See MODEL CODE OF

JUDICIAL CONDuCr Canon 3E(l) (1990).
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appearance of impropriety whenever possible."'93 Thus, § 455(a) covers
all forms of interest and bias, and requires them "all to be evaluated on
an objective basis, so that what matters is not the reality of bias or
prejudice but its appearance." '
Explaining the legislative history of § 455, the Supreme Court has
noted that "people who have not served on the bench are often all too
willing to indulge suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity of
judges." 95 Section 455(a) was therefore adopted to "promote confidence
in the judiciary"9 6 by avoiding those "suspicions and doubts" 97 The
statute's objective standard-which is to be applied "universally"9' and
"whenever possible"99-means that a judge cannot remain in a case on
the ground that he, personally, is a person of integrity who would not be
affected by "extraordinary intimidation" that has "hopelessly compromised" his impartiality in a pending case. The same result is required as
a matter of constitutional due process of law, which requires a judge to
disqualify himself to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. 00
Thus, Judge Baer was required to disqualify himself from Ms.
Bayless's case prior to the hearing in which he reversed his original
decision. This, however, was not the course Judge Baer followed. On the
contrary, he reversed his suppression decision,10 1 and denied a defense
motion to disqualify him several days later. 2 Over one month later
Judge Baer recused himself."3 In doing so, he placed the blame not on
the politicians who had pressured him, but on Ms. Bayless, giving the

93. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847,865 (citing S. REP. No. 93-419,
at 5 (1973); H.L REP. No. 93-1453, at 5).
94. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548.
95. Lijeberg,486 U.S. at 864-65.
96. Id. at 865.
97. Id. at 864.
98. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 548.
99. Lijeberg,486 U.S. at 865.
100. See, e.g., Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148
(1968); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
101. See United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y.), vacating 913 F. Supp. 232
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
102. See Van Natta, Dismissing Defense Effort, supra note 72, § 1, at 25. Counsel for Ms.
Bayless noted that "[niever before have the President of the United States, the Speaker of the
House, 140 members of Congress and a Presidential candidate sat in on a case and said that a
Federal judge should be impeached or resign."' Id
103. See Van Natta, Judge Takes Himself Off Case, supra note 72, at Bl.
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implausible reason that his belated withdrawal might avoid a defense
challenge to his decision to admit the evidence."°
Assume, however, that Judge Baer had recused himself prior to the
rehearing, expressly putting the responsibility on those who had
compromised his impartiality. How would that have served the interests
of either judicial independence or Ms. Bayless? The answer lies in the
next step in the proceeding. Any judge assigned to replace Judge Baer
would inevitably be aware of the political pressures in the case and
would be similarly compromised in reconsidering Judge Baer's original
decision to suppress the evidence. Thus, no judge could properly have
conducted a rehearing of Judge Baer's decision, meaning that his
decision to suppress the evidence would have remained the law of the
case. Of course, the government might then have sought a reversal on
appeal, but appellate judges would have been disqualified from sitting in
the case by the same political pressures.105
Arguably, this proves too much. According to the Rule of Necessity,
if all judges are disqualified, then at least those judges who are members
of "'a court of last resort"' are permitted to sit. 5 Thus, the Supreme
Court, at least, could have chosen to review Judge Baer's decision. But
that review would be discretionary. As the Supreme Court has held, the
Rule of Necessity requires a court in each case to balance two public
interests. One is the public interest in having the case decided; the other
is the public interest in avoiding a decision that would be tainted by the
appearance of interest or bias on the part of the judge."0 7
In deciding whether to hear an appeal in Judge Baer's case, the
Supreme Court would know that a remand of the case would require
Judge Baer, or any substitute judge, to conduct proceedings once again
"under pressure" and "under fire." In addition, the Supreme Court would

104. See id. A month later, Ms. Bayless pleaded guilty after Judge Robert P. Patterson, Jr. ruled

that she could nevertheless appeal Judge Baer's ruling that the evidence was admissible. See Don
Van Natta, Jr.,A PublicizedDrug CourierPleads Guilty to 3 Felonies, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1996,

§ 1, at23.
105. Also, an appellate court would have had difficulty reversing Judge Baer's factual findings,
because they were based in part on the demeanor of Ms. Bayless and the officers.

106. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 214 (1980) (quoting State ex rel. Mitchell v. Sage
Stores Co., 143 P.2d 652, 656 (Kan. 1943)). Arguably, too, the Rule of Necessity applies to courts

other than those of last resort. If so, it could apply to Judge Baer or another trial judge. The rationale
of the nle, however, is that "'failure [of a judge to sit] would result in a denial of a litigant's

constitutional right to have a question, properly presented to such court, adjudicated."' Id. (quoting
Sage Stores Co., 143 P.2d at 656). In Ms. Bayless's case, both the defendant and the government
had had their day in court at the first suppression hearing.
107. See id. at 217.
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recognize that a "Judiciary free from control by the Executive and the
Legislature is essential if there is a right to have claims decided by
judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of
government." ' 8 Thus, there would be good reason for all judges to let
Judge Baer's decision in the first suppression hearing stand.
The lesson in this for politicians would be clear. When Judge Baer
caved in to the pressures, the irresponsible politicians won, and they can
only have been emboldened to do the same thing again in the future. If,
however, the prosecution of Ms. Bayless had been aborted as a result of
the politicizing of the case, the message would have been that
irresponsible criticism of decisions in pending cases will backfire against
the critics.
There would be two salutary results to this approach. First,
politicians would be on notice that their efforts to affect the outcome
of cases by interfering with the independence of the judiciary would
not have the desired effect. This might not silence all irresponsible
politicians, but it could give pause at least to some. Second, citizens
would not have to suffer prosecutions in which their statutory and
constitutional rights are violated by having their cases decided by judges
who lack the appearance of impartiality. The latter result addresses the
real problem of judicial independence-the impact on litigants whose
cases are decided by judges whose impartiality has been compromised by
political pressures. And that problem can indeed be solved by judges
who honor their statutory and constitutional duties to recuse themselves
from sitting in such cases.

108. Id. at 217-18.
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